Recent evidence suggests that people are highly efficient at detecting conflicting outputs produced by competing intuitive and analytic reasoning processes. Specifically, De Neys and Glumicic (2008) demonstrated that participants reason longer about problems that are characterized by conflict (as opposed to agreement) between stereotypical personality descriptions and base-rate probabilities of group membership. However, this finding comes from problems involving probabilities much more extreme than those used in traditional studies of base-rate neglect. To test the degree to which these findings depend on such extreme probabilities, we varied base-rate probabilities over five experiments and compared participants' response time for conflict problems with non-conflict problems. Longer response times for stereotypical responses to conflict versus non-conflict problems were found only in the presence of extreme probabilities. Our results suggest that humans may not be consistently efficient at detecting conflicts during reasoning.
Introduction
According to dual-process theories (Evans, 2008; Frankish & Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2004) , reasoning and decision-making are based on two qualitatively different types of cognitive processes (Evans, 2009 (Evans, , 2011a : Type 1 (T1) processes are fast, intuitive, and high capacity whereas Type 2 (T2) processes are slow, deliberative, and analytical. They contrast, in that, T1 processing provides quick default outputs while T2 processing is engaged deliberately to manipulate explicit representations via working memory (Evans, 2010) .
A key finding is that the output of T1 processing often dominates reasoning such that participants frequently exhibit poor performance on problems that elicit an incorrect intuitive response (Evans, 2008) . This performance deficit is usually explained by a lack of T2 override -i.e., participants are unable to engage in sufficient analytic processing to overcome their initial intuitive response (Evans, 2008; Frankish & Evans, 2009; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 2004 ).
Dual-process theory and base-rate neglect
A classic finding from the heuristics and biases research program is base-rate neglect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) . Consider the following problem (from De Neys and Glumicic (2008) For this problem, the personality description suggests a different response (''doctor'') than does the base-rate information (''nurse''). Many studies have shown that people, when faced with such problems, tend to base their judgments on the individuating information (here, the personality description) and neglect or underweight the base-rate (for a review, see Barbey & Sloman, 2007) . The question addressed here is whether people recognize the conflict
